Interview - Adam Harmon
(We are pleased to present to you our latest interview: Adam Harmon, author of Lonely Soldier. Many thanks to Sarina Evan at Random House for facilitating).
NZ: First and foremost, what compelled you to write this, and why now?
AH: I wanted to enable people to gain a deeper understanding of the Israeli military by describing typical experiences that Israeli soldiers like me have faced over the course of the last fifteen years.
Even though the fighting in Gaza and in Lebanon flared soon after my book was released, I hope that it provides details and insights relating to the Israeli military culture, training methods, and operations that will make it an interesting read irrespective of current events.
NZ: One of the most interesting aspects of the book is how different the IDF is as compared to the American Military. Whether it is true or not, the American Military has an image of blind faith in your superior, abusive sergeants, and massive air assaults. More recently, the image of the American Army is of a group of soldiers racing through the streets of Baghdad in broad daylight on the back of a Humvee with a documentary film crew riding along. What do you think are the main differences between the Israeli and the American Army?
AH: First and foremost, national service is compulsory in Israel. While most highly motivated American high school students are trying to gain entrance into Ivy League schools, their Israeli counterparts are testing to join elite infantry, air force, and intelligence units. As a result, Israeli military units select from a much larger pool of qualified candidates than the American military. This enables Israel to constantly increase standards for acceptance at a time when the American military is lowering the bar.
Of course, as people who have served in the military can attest, being one of the “best and the brightest” doesn’t necessary mean that you’re going to be a fantastic soldier. And more importantly, it’s valuable to note that soldiers who lacked many advantages growing up or who weren’t stellar scholars during school may well demonstrate an aptitude in the field that is far superior to their well-heeled peers. As I mention in my book, I have served with some smart people who were dumb soldiers and others who barely completed high school who I would completely trust with my life once we were in the field.
But the combination of mandatory service and the high concentration of over-achievers in the Israeli military has created a culture that is more adaptive than the US military. By adaptive, I refer to the fact that the Israeli military highly encourages change in a way that is very different from the US military. In the Israeli military, new recruits are taught to ask questions and provide constructive criticism. This forces commanders to lead by example and by gaining consensus from his team, as opposed to leading through fiat, as is done in the US military. This keeps commanders on their toes and creates a conduit for new ideas and innovations that make the military more effective over time, while creating the short-term benefit of avoiding missteps that may occur when decisions are made by a single individual.
Another interesting difference is that the Israeli military training methodology features a level of on-the-job training that is rather unique. Israeli soldiers, at the beginning stages of their training, are tasked with relatively low-intensity missions – manning a checkpoint on a secondary road, conducting an ambush in a place where there is a low probability of engaging the enemy, patrolling relatively quiet streets, etc. The consequence is that the proficiency of soldiers and commanders are tested in an evolutionary way that enables superiors to decide whether they are suitable for more complicated tasks, soldiers are able to better understand how their training relates to the real-world, and the gradual introduction to more complicated scenarios increases effectiveness while reducing associated stress. By contrast, American soldiers only experience real combat after completing their training in full.
NZ: In addition, there have been many recent stories about how the US army has recruited Israeli military specialists to consult them on how to better fight in the urban settings of Basra and Baghdad. What do you think of this?
AH: There are certainly ongoing exchanges of information between IDF officers and US commanders at most every level. I have no doubt that US commanders, looking to become more effective in urban environments are speaking with Israeli counterparts who have vast experience. In addition, I believe that US military forces are even training – for short periods of time – with Israeli forces in order to learn new techniques that may make them more effective and less vulnerable in the field. And I’m sure that there are individuals with military expertise who are providing information or delivering a service to the US military as private citizens. I have been doing what little I can – without asking for compensation – for several years.
I think this sharing of expertise is a positive thing. As America’s staunchest ally in the region and a country with deep experience with urban warfare, we should extend every effort to help the US. Furthermore, I have no doubt that after more than three years in Iraq and Afghanistan the US military has developed techniques and learned lessons that also will prove useful to Israeli efforts to secure its own borders.
NZ: Seeing as you have crossed the line between American Jew and Israeli; tell us your thoughts on the perceptions/misperceptions of the IDF from American Jewry.
AH: Since the release of my book, I’ve had the opportunity to speak to both Jewish and non-Jewish audiences. Overall, there is a great deal of affection and respect for the IDF in the US. A vast majority of Americans I’ve met see the IDF as being a thoroughly professional and effective fighting force. But since they are only armed with the basic facts – military service is mandatory, both men and women serve, and the fighting spirit –many of Israel’s supporters find it difficult to respond to the misrepresentations of the Israeli military that often finds its way into the media. The more American Jews – and people in general – know about our values, the demographics of the military, and the procedures used by Israel in the field, the easier it will be for them to express solidarity with our actions and the harder it will be for our adversaries to use unsubstantiated claims of atrocities committed or exaggerated descriptions of Israeli military treatment of Arab civilians to manipulate public opinion.
I have found that even Jewish American audiences are surprised to learn that Israeli soldiers are legally bound to disregard immoral orders, stop individual from committing immoral acts, and report any untoward activity. Furthermore, many are unaware that many Israeli Arabs – both Bedouin and Druze to name just two groups – serve with the Israeli military. In addition, people don’t understand that the bulk of the Israeli military is comprised of reservists who are engineers, lawyers, farmers, marketing professionals, and students 335 days out of the year. The more people know about the Israeli military – what happens typically during raids, at checkpoints, and during patrols – the more they’ll see that the Israeli soldiers serving along the border with Lebanon and conducting operations in the West Bank or Gaza isn’t all that different from themselves.
NZ: You note the IDFs informality and respect for individual expression. This manifests itself in how rank is not important, how everybody is addressed by first name and more importantly in how it is a soldier’s duty to refuse any order he/she deems immoral. With so much focus on individual expression, how is it that Israeli soldiers are so unified? One would expect significant dissension and internal conflict.
AH: It might seem counter-intuitive, but you actually increase cohesion by empowering individual soldiers to question the decisions made by their superiors. By creating a culture where corporals and colonels are on a first name basis, you eliminate a potential source of dissension. By making commanders someone soldiers can joke with and talk to as an equal – as opposed to members of a separate group to whom you can’t act or speak freely – the Israeli military culture invites discussions that reduce the potential for pent-up frustration and increases motivation because individual soldiers feel like they are part of the decision to act as opposed to feeling like a decision is being forced upon them.
In my book, I describe a moment within my own unit where frustration with our duties led to dissention. In a strongly hierarchical military culture like the US, it’s likely that a commander would have ignored the soldier’s complaints, responded with threats, or collaborated with his superior officer to make adjustments based on their judgment or what was best for the soldiers. My commander, by contrast, called a meeting. He listened to our complaints and together, through consensus and give-and-take, a new plan was jointly developed by the soldiers and our commander. In our case, frustration evaporated immediately, our cohesion as a unit grew to be the strongest in the company, our trust in our commander increased tremendously, and our willingness to endure difficulties as team knew no bounds.
NZ: On pg 132 you mention an extensive training exercise that you went through with your battalion where 11 people fainted from heat exhaustion. Throughout the book there are countless examples of sleepless nights, seemingly endless marches, and grueling physical trainings. Do you think that the Israeli army pushes its soldiers too far physically and/or emotionally?
AH: In general, I do not think that the Israeli military pushes its soldiers too far. In fact, I believe that the Israeli military needs to work its soldiers – both conscripts and reservists harder. On the one hand, it’s incredibly important to ensure the safety of recruits during training. Over the years, recruits in combat units have died due to dehydration and other mistakes by the officers responsible for their training. Of course, the unnecessary loss of life needs to be reduced and protocols for this purpose need to be followed. That said, our enemies train hard and our soldiers need to be ready. The old adage, “ka’sheh b’imoon, kal b’krav” still holds true. At every stage of training, recruits and commanders should feel mentally, physically, and intellectually challenged.
I am not suggesting that today’s soldiers aren’t training hard. In fact, I’d wager that today’s paratroopers are more capable than those that came before them. But that doesn’t mean that we can’t work harder. This is especially true for reserve units. The Israeli reserves proved capable during Operation Defensive Shield and the reservists that served in Lebanon this past summer demonstrated an ability to fight against a determined, well-armed, highly-trained enemy, but given the likelihood that Israel won’t achieve peace with its neighbors in the near future, lives depend on the Israeli military providing reserve units with the resources needed to achieve the highest standards of professionalism.
NZ: You spend a lot of time reminding the reader of the humanity of the Israeli army, and how there is such an extensive emphasis placed respect for life. Some people are aware of Israel’s distinctive “progressive” military mentality, but an overwhelming larger amount of people think Israel commits daily crimes against humanity (mentioned pg 83 and 84). How can Israel fight this image?
AH: Hopefully, one lesson drawn from the conflict in Lebanon is the importance of Information Operations (the military term for public relations). While Hezbollah and its supporters coordinated efforts to hit the airwaves, Israel was denying the media the opportunity to embed with infantry units. During Operation Defensive Shield and the Disengagement, the Israeli military allowed a limited number of journalists to embed with units. Those instances led to reports that describe Israeli protocols and clearly demonstrated the risks that Israeli soldiers take in order to mitigate the loss of civilian life. By granting the media with greater access to our troops and operations – but within guidelines that protect a soldier’s right to privacy and without revealing vital sources or methods – the wider world will see that the morality of the Israeli military matches, and in some ways may even surpass, that of other Western countries.
In Lebanon, when the exaggerated claims of civilian deaths were plentiful and most images of the Israeli military consisted of tank movements and air planes, it would have been instructive to enable the world to see the air strikes that were called off and how Israeli troops went house-to-house instead of utilizing the firepower at their disposal. Our officials talked about it, but in today’s world, the power of video footage can’t be beat. Even when it was known that our adversaries were staging events, the image of a crumpled building trumps the picture of a Merkava. Especially when you’re acting honorably, you should let as many people as you can see it.
NZ: You mention on pg 161 that being Israeli and being a soldier are synonymous. Does this mean that there is no other way of being Israeli, or that not completing military duty makes you less of an Israeli?
AH: That’s not exactly what I meant. I don’t believe that serving with the military makes an individual a better citizen or that lack of service makes you less Israeli in any way.
That comment refers to a moment in time where I had to make a decision between continuing to serve with the military – as either an officer or by joining an elite unit – or becoming a civilian at the end of my compulsory service. Since almost all of my experiences as an Israeli citizen at that time revolved around my being soldier, the two had merged to some extent. But because I came to Israel to build a life, I decided to become a civilian, find an apartment, get a job and see what it was like to live day-to-day as an Israeli civilian.
NZ: You point out that toward the end of your 13 year service that attitudes in the army have changed, especially with regard to the use of force and targeted killings. Tell us more about this change in attitude.
AH: To be clear, over the entire period of my service there has been one constant – civilian deaths must be avoided at all costs, including putting the lives of Israeli soldiers at more risk. That said, there was a change in policy regarding individuals identified as terrorists. When I first joined the military in 1990, our objective was to capture suspected terrorists alive. Beyond the desire not to shed blood unnecessarily was the recognition that by killing these individuals we were possibly creating more martyrs and we were losing out on the chance to gain information about other terrorists through interrogation. For this reason, most of our missions in the 90’s were focused on the capture of suspected terrorists. But since the Oslo Peace Process only led to increasingly violent terrorist attacks against civilians, culminating in nearly daily attacks in 2002, the Israeli military experimented with a new policy of targeted killings. The death of leading terrorists and individuals considered to be “ticking bombs” was now the stated objective. The rationale was that these individuals were responsible for multiple murders, planning additional murders, or on their way to commit murder and therefore it was morally acceptable to kill them before they could shed additional blood. In addition, the strategy was meant to keep the terrorist leadership so busy with staying alive that their ability to plan terrorist attacks would be disrupted. Since there was a clear correlation between this policy and the reduction in successful attacks, the policy was continued.
For myself, I was very surprised to see in 2003 that I was eager to carry out a mission to kill presumed terrorist leaders who we were told might attend a funeral procession near Sanur. In the end, the mission was poorly planned and I was very glad when no one showed up. But I did recognize the difference in my personal views. For the first time, I really wanted to kill. In the past, I had been very dispassionate about my work as a soldier. I was very surprised to discover that my frustration with the Palestinian leadership and their seeming preference to murder my people over the opportunity to build a nation for their own would make me enjoy a successful mission in a way that I would not have ten years ago.
NZ: As a follow up, there has been a noticeable change in the attitude of Israeli civilians toward the military, with “Refusniks” becoming more and more common. What are your thoughts on this change in mentality?
AH: I think that the “refusenik” problem in Israel is a red herring that is blown out of proportion in both the Israeli and Western media. The individuals who protest military policy or sign their names saying that they don’t want to serve in or support military operations continue to be so minuscule in number – let alone as a percent of the total population that does serve – that it should barely register. But since military service is so vital to the security of Israel and still overwhelmingly supported by the public, any organized demonstration against this institution receives a disproportionate share of media exposure. For instance, the number of individuals who recently protested government decisions that kept the Israeli military from using its power more fully and effectively in Lebanon were much larger and will, especially in comparison to those few “refuseniks,” actually have a dramatic impact on future government policy.
NZ: You state that you wonder if Israeli restraint only encourages more violence (which you acknowledge is a right wing hawkish mentality). Explain….
AH: As someone who identified with the center-left throughout the 80’s and 90’s, I can’t help but wish that recent history had not provided ample data points to suggest that Israeli policies of restraint were based on an overly-optimistic assessment of the Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian leadership. Especially throughout the 90’s – during the Oslo Peace Process and negotiations with Syria – Palestinian terror and Hezbollah activity increased at an alarming rate. At the time, I believed that we were experiencing the last gasp of reactionaries who would eventually be sidelined by moderates who wanted a true rapprochement with Israel.
Also, I didn’t worry about Hezbollah victory speeches when Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. Arab leaders are masters at self-congratulation in the aftermath of their defeats. But the continuing militancy of Hezbollah after Israel’s withdrawal and Arafat’s decision to spark a second Intifadah made it clear that my more cynical friends – who believed that we should be paying closer attention to what Arab leaders were saying in Arabic and not English – were right. The terrorists were not just using incitement and murder to gain more power within their own societies, they were – and still are – the vanguard of a culture that refuses to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and believes that Western values make us weak. As a result, they have interpreted our outstretched hands as a sign that the Israeli people in particular – and the West in general – does not have the will or ability to defeat them.
I do believe that Israel should use restraint and sometimes unilateral decisions can improve your strategic position, but these policies must be part of a comprehensive plan that takes into account the fact that the way that we perceive our actions – and inaction – is different from the way it is understood by our enemies. And this must be taken into account.
NZ: How does that relate to relate this to what recently happened in Gaza and Lebanon, two areas where the IDF withdrew yet violence acts against Israel continued. Could it be that the hawkish views are correct, and we are seeing the negative ramifications of attempting restraint and disengagement?
AH: I think it has less to do with military restraint and disengagement as it does with the failure to follow-through on strategies that would have undermined the capabilities of Hezbollah and Hamas. Over the last 6 years, there has been a lack of effort on the part of the Lebanese people and the international community to free themselves from the influence of Syria and Iran. For its part, Israel could have been more pro-active – politically and militarily – in its efforts to decrease the flow of weapons into Lebanon, but in this respect the international community’s failure to help Lebanon – especially after the Cedar Revolution – dismantle Hezbollah only served to embolden Nasrallah, Assad, and Ahmednejad. As for Gaza, the failure of the international community to speak with a single voice and apply real pressure on the Palestinian leadership to end its attacks – either via rocket or terrorist activity – on Israel. Even though the international community has held back some support from the Hamas government, there is still widespread support for Palestinian institutions. Overall, there is a willingness on the part of the international community to accept the argument that weak governments do not have complete control over their territory. This policy enables governments like Lebanon and the PA to abdicate responsibility for terror activity as opposed to strongly encouraging a leadership to dismantle radical groups and cease belligerent behavior. Israel can certainly do much to diminish capabilities of terrorist infrastructures, but without the full backing of the international community and the local leadership, little progress will be made. Recent history has made this apparent. Violence spiked while direct negotiations occurred during Oslo as well as after the unilateral
NZ: You state that over your years of service you became “detached and hardened” from the carnage. Do you think that Israeli citizens, who are markedly influenced by the militarily structure, are also desensitized, and is there a danger in this?
AH: Our experiences certainly impact the way we view the world in which we live. As a soldier, you certainly become desensitized to the dangers you face. And as a civilian, you become used to hearing about attacks. Especially when the frequency of terror attacks increase, there is a tendency to become more circumspect and less emotional in your reaction.
To my mind, despite the fact that an individual’s experience in the military can have a deep impact on his or her life, I don’t see the Israeli culture as being very martial. In fact, in many ways I see many Israelis as both consciously and unconsciously striving to distance themselves from the lives they knew in the military. That probably helps the country maintain a healthy balance between the need to maintain an effective military force and the desire to create a thriving liberal society.
NZ: Another interesting point you make is when you describe your years as a reservist, before your return to the states. You mention how if you had stayed in Israel you would most probably be “unemployed or underemployed”. You also make small mention of how your work at the time owed you money, and how the Histadrut Union neglected to help you solve the problem. It seems like you give your heart and soul in support of the country through being a soldier, but the second you stop soldiering the country does not give you the same support as a civilian… what do you think?
AH: There’s no question that my life as a civilian wasn’t easy. I had a roof over my head, ate well, and could enjoy popcorn at movies, but like so many other new immigrants I was terribly under-employed. The best and probably most highly paid job I had was tutoring English twice a week to the child of a well-known family in Jerusalem.
Of course, the fact that my core competency turned out to be writing didn’t help matters. If I had been a marine biologist or economist, becoming a success in my industry would have occurred over time. And who knows, everything could have changed for me in that 11th year.
Even though I blame my employer – the owner of PC Mac Zone in Israel – for failing to meet his obligations and my lawyer at the Histradrut for giving me bad advice, but ultimately I take responsibility for my failure to build a life in Israel.
I believe the country provided me with all the support I needed in order to survive. I wasn’t starving and was never in danger of becoming an indigent. But I wanted more than that. And although my initial return to the US was meant to be temporary, it was extended precisely because I knew that I would never have the professional opportunities in Israel that I had in the US. I hoped that by gaining more experience in the US, I might improve my chances of being hired for a position with an Israeli firm (Anyone need a Director of Marketing?).
It was my fear that I would return to unemployment or end up still working as an over-educated guard at the age of 32 that held me back.
And beyond the institutions of government, I had an incredible amount of community support in Israel. Between good friends, the family that practically adopted me, and the random people with whom I interacted every day, I had all the support that a person needs to feel loved and at home.
Unfortunately, sometimes even that is not enough to keep you from leaving home.
NZ: It is interesting to note that throughout your entire memoir your unit does not actually kill a single person. Even when you are instructed to destroy the home of a known suicide bomber your unit is meticulous in ensuring that there are no casualties. How does this relate to the mass media portrayal of the Israeli Army as a “killing machine”? For that matter, how can the IDF best work on their PR?
AH: As I mentioned earlier, soldiers are taught at the earliest stages of training to capture suspected terrorists and mitigate the loss of Palestinian life. The US Marines have a saying, “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy.” I think the media has trouble with the idea that soldiers and military institutions can be at once deeply committed to a highly ethical policy – such as putting our soldiers at risk in order to keep Palestinian civilians from harm – while at the same time being completely ruthless against our enemies. Our enemies should think of us as killing machines, but civilians should know that we mean them no harm.
And in order to achieve this, I believe the Israeli military needs to embrace the media more and employ best practice modern mass communication techniques to conduct successful information operations. We must use available technology to enable the world to know us bet